This essay reviews some of the most important demographic trends expected to occur between 2010 and 2050, indicates some of their implications for economic and global development, and suggests some possible policies to respond these trends and implications. The interactions of population, economics, the environment, and culture are central. In the past decade, for the first time in history, old people outnumbered young people, urban people outnumbered rural people, and women of reduced fertility outnumbered women of high fertility. The century from 1950 to 2050 will have included the highest global population growth rate ever, the largest voluntary fall in the global population growth rate ever, and the most enormous shift ever in the demographic balance between the more developed regions of the world and the less developed ones. In the coming half century, according to most demographers, the world's population will grow older, larger (albeit more slowly), and more urban than in the 20th century, but with much variance within and across regions. No one knows what numbers and demographic characteristics of humans are sustainable, but it is clear that the prodigious stain of a billion or so chronically hungry people at present results from recent and ongoing collective human choices, not biophysical necessities. Concrete policy options to respond to demographic trends include providing universal primary and secondary education, particularly education for global and household civility; eliminating unmet needs for contraception and reproductive health; and implementing demographically sensitive urban planning, particularly construction for greater energy efficiency and friendliness to older people.
Introduction
The aim of this essay is to review some of the most important demographic trends between 2010 and 2050, to indicate some of their implications for economic and global development, and to suggest some possible policies in response to these trends and implications.
Section 2 insists that the interactions of population, economics, the environment, and culture cannot be neglected. This theme is developed by examples throughout the chapter. Section 3, looking backward, reviews the remarkable transitions of global population in this decade and this century. Section 4, looking forward, identifies four major trends in global human population over the coming half century. Section 5 considers future sustainability and widespread hunger now.
Turning to the consequences for action of the demographic trends previously reviewed, the concluding section 6 reviews three broad classes of panaceas, then proposes policy options in three areas: universal primary and secondary education, including education for global and household civility; contraceptive and reproductive health services; and age-sensitive urban planning, including more energy efficient buildings. Some important, complex areas of policy are not discussed in section 6: international migration, with all its economic, political, moral and social implications; pro-natalist family policy, in countries with present or incipient declines in population; policies regarding HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, influenza, and other major infectious diseases; and policies regarding the balance between preventive public health and curative medicine, in particular, regarding tobacco, the major preventable cause of death in the world. Population, economics, the environment and culture all matter A key challenge is to keep demographic variables in sight while keeping them in perspective. Population matters, but not to the exclusion of economics, the environment and culture. To keep all four of these concerns in mind, I envision a tetrahedron with -population‖ at the peak and -economics,‖ -environment,‖ and -culture‖ at the three corners of the triangular base ( Figure 1 ). This visual image is a reminder that -population,‖ -economics,‖ -the environment,‖ and -culture‖ (including law, politics, education, religion, institutions and traditions) are constantly interacting partial descriptions of the human situation. Depending on the viewer's orientation, the peak could just as well be occupied by economics, the environment, or culture as by population, provided that the interactions of all four are kept in mind.
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Population in transition
The global human population has undergone remarkable transitions in this decade and this century.
Transitions of this decade
The current decade spans three unique, important transitions in the history of humankind. 3 2003 on, the median woman worldwide (though not the average woman) had, and will probably continue to have, too few or just enough children during her lifetime to replace herself and the father in the following generation. 4 Because very high fertility continues in some regions, and because high fertility in recent decades has led to a high proportion now of young women of an Figure 1 . Global change is driven by the interaction of population, the environment, economics, and culture (including politics, law and education).
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age to bear children, the average woman worldwide has roughly half a child more than required to replace herself and the father in the following generation.
Transitions of this century
The Global human population never grew with such speed before the 20th century and is likely never again to grow with such speed. Our descendants will look back on the late 1960s peak as the most significant demographic event in the history of the human population even though those of us who lived through it did not recognize it at the time.
Second, the dramatic fall since 1970 of the global population growth rate to 1.1% or 1. Third, the last half century saw, and the next half century will see, an enormous shift in the demographic balance between the more developed regions of the world and the less developed ones. In 1950 the less developed regions had roughly twice the population of the more developed ones. By 2050 the ratio will probably exceed six to one. 9 These colossal changes in the composition and dynamics of the human population by and large escape public notice.
4.

Four big demographic trends to 2050
Four major trends are expected to dominate changes in the human population in the coming half-century, according to most demographers. The population will grow bigger, more slowly, more urban, and older than in the 20th century.
Less certain than these trends, though potentially no less important, are future possible trends in international and internal (within-country) migration and in the structure of families and households. Unfortunately, present demographic data and tools provide inadequate quantitative guidance about future changes in these factors. I will mention migration and household structure later.
It is important to approach all such projections with modesty. These projections remain uncertain because, for example, no one knows how closely future rates of birth, death and urbanization will resemble their assumed future trends. No one knows precisely how confident to be about these projections. Despite their uncertainty, the projections do suggest some challenges humanity will face over the next 50 years. There is little disagreement among demographers
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4.1
The global human population is still growing rapidly, but not in all places equally
Although the rate of population growth has fallen since the 1970s, current rates (as a percentage) and absolute numbers of global population growth are still greater than any experienced prior to World War II. Rapid global population growth has not ended. 10 Human numbers currently increase by 75 million to 80 million people annually, the equivalent of adding another U.S. population every four years or so. 11 Whereas the first absolute increase in population by one billion people took from the beginning of time until the early 19th century, one billion people will be added to today's population in only 13 to 14 years. The world's population is projected to reach over 9 billion by 2050, depending on future birth and death rates. 12 The for Applied Systems Analysis, the median population projection peaks around nine billion people near 2070. 17 The imbalances between the rapid population growth of poor countries and the slowing population growth or decline in population size of rich countries will increase the potential for international migration. If fertility continues to fall as anticipated, people will have fewer siblings, cousins, aunts, and uncles. Extended families will shrink. Reproduction and child rearing will occupy a smaller portion of adult life, diminishing the importance of the reproductive function of marriage.
Unless patterns of co-habitation change in ways contrary to long-term historical trends ( Figure   3 ), the average number of people per household will continue to decline and the numbers of households will rise even faster than the numbers of people. Changing household demography will have environmental consequences because important energy demands are more closely associated with numbers of households than with numbers of people. 22, 23, 24 For example, Mackellar and colleagues 22 (p. 860, their Table 7) analyzed energy consumption from 1970 to 1990 separately for the more developed regions and the less developed regions according to two models, one based on numbers of individuals and the other based on numbers of households. For the more developed regions, the growth of population (individuals) accounted for 18% of the growth of energy consumption, while changes in income and technology accounted for 36% of the growth of energy consumption. In the alternative analysis, the growth in the number of households in the more developed regions accounted for 41% of the growth of energy consumption, while changes in income and technology accounted for 13%. In the less developed regions over this interval, the alternative analyses differed only slightly because household sizes changed little.
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The differences between projections of the future based on numbers of individuals and projections based on numbers of households were striking. When Mackellar and colleagues 22 (p.
862, their Table 9 ) assumed constant emissions of carbon dioxide per person between 1990 and 2100, total emissions of carbon dioxide were projected to increase by 88%; but when they assumed constant emissions of carbon dioxide per household, total carbon dioxide emissions were projected to increase by 167% between 1990 and 2100. The contrasts were equally striking when Mackellar and colleagues assumed constant rates of increase in emissions per person or per household. Even if these projections may not be definitive in quantitative detail, they made an unmistakable point: changes in fertility and other behaviors that influence the sizes and numbers of future households could affect future impacts of humans on their environment at least as much as, and possibly much more than, changes in total population size.
Population will grow older, but not in all places equally
Slowing population growth everywhere means that the 20th century was probably the last in human history in which younger people outnumbered older ones. The proportion of all people who were children aged four years and younger peaked in 1955 at 14.5% and gradually declined This crossover in the proportions of young and old reflected both improved survival and reduced fertility. The average life span grew from perhaps 30 years at the beginning of the 20th century to more than 65 years at the beginning of the 21st century. 26 The increase in average lifespan resulted partly from increasing incomes and partly from increases in length of life at a Joel E. Cohen
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given level of income. But reduced fertility influenced the proportions of young and old more than increasing longevity influenced those proportions because reduced fertility added smaller numbers to the younger age groups.
The demographic transition from high birth and death rates (with high variability over time in both birth rates and death rates) to low birth and death rates (low death rates especially at early ages) with lower variability in both birth and death rates was accompanied by an epidemiologic transition. As the age structure of a population shifted from young to old, the fraction of deaths caused primarily by infectious diseases and diseases associated with childbirth declined while the fraction of deaths caused primarily by non-communicable diseases increased. 27 The original statements of the theory of the epidemiological transition made assumptions about the directions of causation between change in the overall level of mortality and change in the distribution of causes of death which have been criticized subsequently. 28 Among the causal factors to be sorted out are changes in age structure; changes in behavioral factors including personal hygiene, addictions to alcohol and tobacco, and the handling (e.g. increase by 60% and the number of people aged 80+ has been projected to increase 160% in the more developed regions, while the corresponding increases for these same two age groups in the less developed regions were projected at 270% and 560%, respectively. Thus aging will proceed even more rapidly in emerging markets than in the more developed regions. But for now the higher present proportions of elderly in more developed countries have excited the interests of some economists in the opportunities for pension funds of rich (older) countries to invest in the more rapid growth of poor (younger) countries. 30 By contrast with the elderly populations of most of the more developed countries, in 11 of the least developed countries-Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger and Uganda-half the population will still be aged 23 years or younger in 2050.
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Some analysts of national security have suggested that -population aging and population decline in the developed world will constrain the ability of the United States and its traditional allies to maintain national and global security. … ‖ 32 They argued that the effects of population ageing and decline will be felt through changes in demographic size, economic performance, and social mood. -The growth rates of the service-age population, of the working-age population, and (therefore) of the GDP in the typical developed country will all fall far beneath their historical trend and also beneath growth rates in most of the rest of the world. In many developed countries, … GDPs may stagnate or even decline.‖ Economically, -As populations age and economic growth slows, employees may become less adaptable and mobile, innovation and entrepreneurship may decline, rates of savings and investment may fall, public-sector deficits may rise, and current account balances may turn negative.‖ Finally, -Psychologically, older societies will become more conservative in outlook and possibly more risk-averse in electoral and leadership behavior. Elder domination of electorates will tend to lock in current public spending commitments at the expense of new priorities. Smaller family size may make the public less willing to risk scarce youth in war. Meanwhile, the rapid growth in minority populations, due to ongoing immigration and higher-than-average minority fertility, may undermine civic cohesion and foster a new diaspora politics.‖
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The effects they projected were not purely negative. This perspective gives insufficient attention to the good news about population aging. 35 One aspect of that good news is offered by a T-shirt that says: -50 is the new 30.‖ The agespecific disability rate at age 60 is defined as the fraction of 60-year-olds who are unable to do the normal activities of daily living, like getting out of bed, getting dressed, washing, and feeding oneself. The United States' disability rate has been falling about 1.5% per year for the last 25
years. The fraction of people aged 60 who are fit is much higher than in the past. A similar improvement in the functioning of older people is going on in Japan and elsewhere. A higher level of education when a person is young predicts a lower risk of disability when the person is older, and education predicts better than income whether an individual will develop a chronic condition such as diabetes or functional limitations. 36 However, it is not yet clear whether the reductions in disability rates result from improvements in the environment and assistive devices that permit greater independence at any given level of health or from improvements in health. 37 Additional good news about population aging is the suggestion that -a country's chances for meaningful democracy increase as its population ages. but was unable to sustain it.‖ Cincotta pointed out that, according to the statistical pattern he identified, China, Cuba, and Russia should be liberalizing democracies, and Thailand should have kept its democracy but did not. Thus demography is not destiny politically, but it seems to matter considerably.
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Age structure also affects energy use. In the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, the older the age of householders, the lower the energy use per person for transportation and the higher the residential energy use per person. 40 The share of household expenditures for energy appears higher for older householders also in China and India. 41 If these patterns are general and if they persist in the future, future increases in the elderly proportion of the population could substantially increase energy consumption per person and the proportion of energy in household expenditures. While the decline in fertility lowers the rate of population growth, reducing pressure on the environment, the increased proportions of elderly and the high propensity among the elderly to head households has the contrary effect of increasing demands on the environment. 22 (pp. 860-861) Demography is not destiny environmentally either, but it seems to matter considerably.
There is little historical precedent for societies as elderly as many of those anticipated for 2050. Consequently, it is difficult to justify empirically any precise image of how such a society will work or feel to its participants. Nevertheless, economics, the environment, and culture will Joel E. Cohen 18 of 40 continue to offer choices about how to influence the quality of a future aged society. For example, the labor force participation of the elderly will be influenced by conventional ages at retirement, by whether jobs for the elderly can gradually taper from fulltime employment to part time employment, and by whether the tasks in elderly employment can be tailored to accommodate the strengths and weaknesses of the elderly. The psychological and physical health of the elderly and their families will be influenced by whether the elderly can maintain stable life partners through marriage or otherwise and by the creativity and adaptability of institutions that employ and care for the elderly. The environment, human-built and natural, will play a crucial role in providing easy money management and telephoning, nearby shopping and public transportation, doors that are easy to open with arthritic hands, protection from infectious diseases, and access to nature. Culture will influence how the elderly are enabled to connect with the young, to continue to grow emotionally and intellectually, and to value themselves even if they are not making as much or any money. Foresightful policies that affect all these possibilities can greatly influence the future world of the elderly.
Population will become more urban, but not in all places equally
People are concentrated in cities. Just over half of all people live in cities on less than 3% of the land area. Among the city dwellers in 2005, approximately 51% lived in cities with fewer than half a million people. The less densely settled half of the land has about 2% of the world's people. Half of Earth's land is very thinly settled.
The world's cities will face an unprecedented confluence of a rapidly aging population and rapid growth in total numbers of people if recent trends continue as projected to 2050. 42 Virtually all of the world's population growth will be in urban areas, and the world's rural Joel E. Cohen 19 of 40 population will be declining by 2050. In effect, the poor countries will have to build the equivalent of a city to accommodate one million people every five days or so for the next 40 to 45 years. 43 This growth in the number of urban people is driven partly by the excess of births over deaths in cities, partly by the migration of rural people into cities, and partly by the reclassification of settlements which have grown enough to move from the category of rural to the category of urban. The United Nations urbanization projections have been criticized as yielding a -systematic overestimation of the world urbanization.‖ 45 Instead of considering urban-rural fertility differentials explicitly, the projections extrapolate differences in the observed rates of growth of urban and rural populations within each country. These growth rates compound natural increase, migration, and reclassification. Unfortunately, there are no widely accepted alternative projections. These projections should be accepted, like all projections, skeptically.
The rapid growth of cities may have environmental advantages and disadvantages. For example, in a very densely settled city like New York, where many people use public transportation, the average person was reported to produce 71% less carbon-dioxide-equivalent greenhouse gases than the United States average (7.1 metric tons per year versus 24.5) . 46 Exactly what these numbers included was unclear. Did they include only the emissions within the city, or emissions from the production of all energy directly consumed within the city even if the energy (e.g., electricity) was generated elsewhere, or did they include the emissions generated elsewhere to produce and transport to the city goods and services other than energy? Were the comparative numbers computed consistently? The large definitional uncertainty of demographic statistics on urban populations also applies to greenhouse gas emissions statistics, especially those for urban or other localized regions.
The growth of cities is expected to be a serious threat to endemic species around them.
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The environment may respond with a threat to cities. Of the roughly 20 megacities with more than 10 million people in 2005, the 15 on coasts or coastal rivers could be adversely affected by even modest rises in sea level. The question of sustainability, or of human carrying capacity, is not a question about mere survival, but whether 2050's billions of people can live with freedom of choice and material prosperity, however freedom and prosperity may then be defined, and whether their children and their children's offspring will be able to continue to live with freedom and prosperity, however they may define them in the future.
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A crucial ingredient is equity in the distribution of wealth. As of 2000, the richest 1% of adults owned 40% of global assets, compared on an exchange rate basis (not purchasing power parity). 55 The next 1% of adults owned 11% of global assets. Thus the top 2% of adults owned 51% of global assets. The inequality in wide distribution of wealth would have been even greater had children been included, as children are concentrated in poor families and poor countries.
Why are inequitable distributions of income and wealth a significant part of the challenge of sustainability? When some people have vastly greater incomes and/or assets than others, the poor may value highly, as crucial to survival, resources that the wealthy value very little because they have so many alternatives. The exhaustion, pollution, or extinction of those resources may scarcely affect the wealthy while bringing disaster or death to the poor. Most published estimates of Earth's human carrying capacity uncritically assumed answers to one or more of these questions. 60 
My book How Many People Can the Earth
Support? analyzed more than five dozen of these estimates published from 1679 onward.
Estimates made in the past half a century ranged from less than one billion to more than 1,000
billion. I learned that these estimates are political numbers, intended to persuade people either that too many humans are already on Earth or that there is no problem with continuing rapid population growth. By contrast, scientific numbers are intended to describe reality. Because no estimates of human carrying capacity have explicitly addressed the questions raised above, taking into account the diversity of views about their answers in different societies and cultures at different times, no scientific estimates of sustainable human population size can be said to exist.
No one knows the path to sustainability because no one knows the destination, if there is one. Too often, attention to long-term sustainability is a diversion from the immediate problems of making tomorrow better than today, a task that offers much room for science and constructive 6 .
Policy choices
The strategies usually proposed by policy advocates in response to world problems of poverty, inequity, disease, exploitation, violence, and environmental transformation, are of three main kinds: 58 create a bigger pie (amplify human productive capacity through investments in technology, and sometimes also through investments in education and health), use fewer forks (increase access to reproductive health care and contraception to slow population growth voluntarily), and practice better manners (improve people's interactions by reforming institutions, policies and practices to achieve greater social and legal equity).
More concrete policy options can be tied to the demographic trends described above.
These options are: universal primary and secondary education, including education for global and household civility; eliminating unmet needs for contraception and reproductive health; and demographically sensitive urban planning, including construction for greater energy efficiency.
Before turning to these possibilities, I want to examine critically a recommendation for a larger population as a solution to poverty.
Collier's Bottom Billion
Seeking to find the most effective ways for the world's poorest to escape poverty, the whether a turnaround occurred. Starting from being a failing state, a country was more likely to achieve a sustained turnaround the larger its population, the greater the proportion of its population that had secondary education, and -perhaps more surprisingly -if it had recently emerged from civil war.‖
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Collier did not recommend that a failing state have a civil war to emerge from, perhaps because he also found that any particular incipient reform was less likely to progress if the country had recently emerged from civil war. 65 But Collier did recommend having a large population. Especially in the poorest countries, his call for a large population seems no less perverse than would have been a call for a recent civil war.
Collier wrote, -Having a large population and having a high proportion of people with secondary education both help. They may well be pointing to the same thing: countries need a critical mass of educated people in order to work out and implement a reform strategy.‖ 66 Yet the secondary completion rate in these failed states (where it has been measured) is so low that the population size hardly limits the number of people with a secondary education. In Haiti, for example, in 2000, the fractions of people with completed lower secondary education to an uncompleted first level of tertiary education were 30% among those aged 15-19 and 31% among those aged 30-34. 67 In the Central African Republic, the corresponding fractions were 20% and 24%. These countries could triple or quintuple their numbers of high school graduates without any increases in population. Further, a country could probably achieve most economies of scale that might result from having a larger population within its borders through collaboration or exchange with its neighbors. The absolute numbers of people are less a constraint on a country's escape from poverty than the way the existing people are educated and organized into countries.
Collier's analysis neglected the adverse effects of rapid population growth on a country's ability to provide education of high quality for its young.
Collier's analysis also measured inappropriately the adverse effects of rapid population growth on a country's age structure. Collier apparently considered among his independent variables the fraction of young people 15-to-24 years old, divided by total population, according 
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In Niger in 1998, for example, women who completed secondary education had 31% fewer children (on average, 4.6 per lifetime) than those who completed only primary education (6.7), as measured by the total fertility rate. In Yemen in 1997, women who completed primary school had 4.6 children on average whereas women who completed secondary school had 3.1 children on average. Different societies have different thresholds for reaping education's benefits of reduced fertility and lower population growth. In some sub-Saharan African societies, lifetime fertility was reduced only among girls who had had 10 or more years of schooling. 71 It is promising that fertility decisions are influenced not just by a woman's own education level, but also by that of the reproductive-age women around her. In one study, for clusters of 25
women of reproductive age in 22 countries of sub-Saharan Africa, higher average levels of education for the women around a given individual reduced her birth rate, independent of urbanization and her individual education level. 72 Education of the surrounding community reduced the total fertility rate only when the average length of education reached four or more years, so minimum thresholds of education were required to reap the fertility benefits of an educated social milieu. The community's level of education contributed to improved survival of children in addition to influencing fertility. concluded that -better education does not only lead to higher individual income but also is a necessary (although not always sufficient) precondition for long-term economic growth.‖ Giving a broad segment of the population a secondary education benefits parents, children, economies, and societies through reduced fertility, improved childhood survival, and better possibilities for economic growth.
As an added bonus, the probability of obesity decreases broadly linearly with increasing years of full-time education where the relation has been studied (Australia, Canada, England and Korea), and the reduction is greater for women than for men. 75 Causality apparently runs from education to obesity because the reduced educational opportunities of obese children hardly affect the relationship.
In addition to how many years children are in school, the content of education also 78 For a world made smaller by the addition of several billion more people, the increasing concentration of people in cities, economic globalization, ever more widespread technologies for cultural contacts, and the constraints of a physically finite Earth, the primacy of global civility as a crucial subject for education at every level seems compelling.
Education should also teach civility within the household. Skills are required to resolve competing demands and desires in ways that protect individual interests and preserve the benefits of having a household, especially when resources are limited. Concretely, if a household's dominant male gets some money or meat, he should be educated to consider the needs for education and protein (and other resources) of the women and children in the house. If a household's dominant female has to discipline children, she should be educated to do it in a way that preserves their dignity, health, autonomy and sense of fairness. When spouses or domestic partners of a household have to resolve conflicts between them, education should give them the skills to hear and respect the concerns of the other and to preserve, if at all possible, the integrity and beneficial aspects of the household.
The stakes involved in educating young people for household civility reach far beyond the household in an aging world. Spouses or domestic partners are each other's primary caregivers in old age. A society that invests wisely in teaching its young people to cope with the normal stresses of living with a partner over the long term will reap a rich return in reduced needs to institutionalize a rapidly growing number of elderly people. 79 The individuals themselves will, of course, benefit even more.
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The additional costs of universal primary and secondary education, beyond what is already being spent, have been estimated and are affordable. 80 
Contraceptive and reproductive health services
A woman is considered to have an unmet need for contraception -if she is fecund, sexually active and not using any contraceptive method, and does not want a child for at least two years. If a woman is pregnant or amenorrheic after giving birth, she is considered to have an unmet need if she had not wanted the pregnancy or birth either when it occurred or ever.‖ 81 In
2008, some 215 million women were considered to have an unmet need for contraception by modern, effective means, 75 million pregnancies were unintended, and about 20 million women had unsafe abortions. 82 Providing modern contraception to women who need it and maternal and newborn health services would reduce unintended pregnancies to an estimated 22 million per year and unsafe abortions to perhaps 5.5 million per year (assuming abortion laws remained unchanged), as well as offering numerous other health, social, and economic benefits. Meeting the unmet need for modern contraception in developing countries would cost an estimated $3.6 billion in 2008 U.S. dollars, on top of the $3.1 billion being spent to serve those who are currently using modern methods.
In addition to eliminating the unmet need for contraception globally, it would be highly desirable to support more research to improve the safety, efficacy, cultural acceptability, and gender generality of contraceptive methods. The present palette of contraceptive choices is far from ideal. Research achievements in this area could benefit both developed and developing countries and the costs should be shared between them.
Education and contraceptive and reproductive health services share a highly desirable moral quality: where such services are available, the potential customers seek them for their own value.
Urban planning, including more energy efficient buildings
As mentioned above, the poor countries will have to build the equivalent of a city to accommodate one million people every five days for the next 40 to 45 years. 43 The world's urban infrastructure in 2000 supported roughly half the number of people it will have to support in 2050. The challenge of meeting such immense needs is obvious. The opportunities are less obvious but equally immense. Cities can be planned to accommodate a higher proportion of elderly people than they have ever accommodated before (bus stops and subway stops with chairs for waiting; doors that open with push bars or electronically rather than with round door knobs that are difficult to grasp). Neighborhoods can be planned to accommodate local needs for shopping, banking, social life, entertainment, and greenery. New cities can be located away from rising seas and away from lands of prime agricultural productivity or of unique biological diversity. Cities can be planned with transport networks that take advantage of population density to make central medical, educational, cultural, and business facilities easily accessible at low energetic cost.
The cost of energy will have to pervade thinking not only about a large scale structure of neighborhoods and transportation networks, but also the design of buildings for housing and business. According to UN-Habitat, 83 -much of the current urban building stock in Europe was designed and constructed when energy was cheap and global warming was unheard of.‖ In the U.K., buildings account for about 45% of all energy consumption, and homes for 27%. 84 In the Joel E. Cohen 33 of 40 U.K., 70% of the buildings in 2050 will be buildings that exist today; therefore, in addition to building more energy-efficient new buildings, it is also imperative to improve the energyefficiency of existing buildings. 85 The largest single use of energy in buildings is for space heating, often consuming as much energy as water heating, lighting, cooling and all other purposes put together. As shown above, elderly individuals spend a higher proportion of their household budgets on energy, and the proportion of elderly people in the population is virtually certain to rise. These behavioral and demographic trends underline the importance of assuring that the domestic and non-domestic buildings of futures cities are designed to be efficient in every use of energy, especially space heating. Improved energy efficiency of buildings would have both economic and environmental benefits.
